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Foreclosure of Options 
In Sequential Resource Development Decisions 
Carl J. Walters 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a series of examples of renewable 
resource development that involve sequential loss of decision 
options even in the absence of irreversible physical change. 
It appears that this "pathological" decision behavior arises 
not because of quantitative errors in judging benefits and 
costs of investment, but rather because basic qualitative 
relationships are often overlooked. Systems analysis as it is 
usually applied may do little more than aggravate the problem; 
we need new ways of looking at relationships between dynamical 
natural systems and the sequential investment decisions in- 
volved in their development. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Resource development decisions are often viewed as iso- 
lated, incremental problems involving choice among a series 
of alternatives at one point in time. Each alternative may be 
defined by a single investment option, or it may involve closed 
(feedback) or open loop (fixed) decision rules for future 
times. But generally the idea is to view the future only in 
terms of present state and projected (often probabilistic) 
future events. Recommendations as to best alternatives are 
usually accompanied by a cautionary comment that future decision 
analyses (usually by different decision makers) should be made 
to keep abreast of changing information and goals. 
Too often we play down the simple fact that decisions 
today may foreclose some of our options for tomorrow; large 
capital investments commit us to policies that try to recover 
sunk costs, hydroelectric dams permanently destroy landscapes, 
insecticide spraying leads to explosive preoutbreak conditions, 
and so forth. We try to represent these problems in the usual 
decision analysis through introduction of concepts such as option 
value (1,2,4) , discounting rate (13) , and "resilience of 
environmental capital" (6), but these measures are meaningful 
only if we can make reasonable probabilistic predictions about 
the future. Far too often the sad experience has been that 
our "reasonable predictions" (usually trend projections) are 
worthless: we almost always omit some key functional relation- 
ship, trends have nasty habits of suddenly reversing themselves, 
and human values can change at an alarming rate (witness the 
"environmental crisis"). 
The problem would not be so serious if we could simply 
ignore or erase each mistake, admit our errors, and start 
afresh. Nor would it be so serious if each irreversible error 
were no more damaging than any other (that is, if we really 
had the economist's unlimited world of possibilities). But 
the world does not appear to be that way: I hope to demonstrate 
in this paper that the usual decision making procedures can 
lead to sequences of situations where each mistake is likely 
to be more serious than the last. 
It is clear that we need a better understanding of the 
process of option foreclosure, of getting locked in, as it occurs 
in sequences of decision analyses. We need to find measures 
of option loss that reflect the possibilities rather than 
just the identifiable probabilities of policy failure. Hopefully, 
by recognizing and being honest about the foreclosure process 
a s  a  s p e c i a l  kind of d e c i s i o n  problem, w e  can begin t o  design 
d e c i s i o n  making s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  move away from t h e  myopia of 
p re sen t  planning procedures.  
2. SOME CONCRETE EXAMPLES 
Before examining some gene ra l  empi r i ca l  p r o p e r t i e s  of 
f o r e c l o s i n g  d e c i s i o n  sequences,  I a t tempt  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  t o  
c l a r i f y  t h e  problem wi th  case  examples. My i n t e n t  i s  t o  make 
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  problem i s  no t  j u s t  a  ma t t e r  of nonrenewable 
r e sources  o r  i r r e v e r s i b l e  phys i ca l  changes; t h a t  i s s u e  has  long 
been of major concern i n  economics ( 4 , 9 ) .  Nor am I simply 
concerned about t h e  obvious f a c t  t h a t  human va lues  may be 
impossible  t o  a s s e s s  c l e a r l y  and can change unexpectedly,  s o  
d e c i s i o n s  now may prevent  f u l f i l l m e n t  of a l t e r n a t i v e  g o a l s  
l a t e r .  
The James Bay Development 
Canada r e c e n t l y  embarked on t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  r e source  
development p r o j e c t  of i t s  h i s t o r y ,  a  h y d r o e l e c t r i c  power 
system i n  t h e  James Bay a r e a  of Northern Quebec. The p r o j e c t  
was so ld  o r i g i n a l l y  l a r g e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  of expected secondary 
b e n e f i t s :  it was t o  provide 100,000 jobs  f o r  a t  l e a s t  two 
decades.  A f t e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  work had begun, some major problems 
became a p p a r e n t ( l 5 )  F i r s t ,  t h e  employment p r o j e c t i o n  was a  b i t  
o p t i m i s t i c ;  t h e  p r o j e c t  w i l l  only employ about  12000 men. 
Second, t h e r e  w i l l  be r a t h e r  s eve re  environmental  damage. Thi rd ,  
t h e  l o c a l  Ind ian  c u l t u r e  (1200 people)  w i l l  probably be d i s -  
rupted due t o  l o s s  of hunt ing ,  f i s h i n g ,  and t r app ing  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
The James Bay Corporat ion and t h e  Quebec government now admit  
p u b l i c l y  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  perhaps  should  never  have been 
s t a r t e d ,  b u t  t hey  a rgue  t h a t  t o o  much money and e f f o r t  ha s  
a l r e a d y  been i n v e s t e d  f o r  it t o  be simply dropped.  
They s e r i o u s l y  propose now t o  deve lop  a  uranium enrichment 
i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  t o  make u s e  of t h e  power. The power was 
t o  be most ly  expor ted  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  b u t  Canada ha s  r e c e n t l y  
been having second t hough t s  about  expo r t i ng  e l e c t r i c a l  energy.  
F u r t h e r ,  Canada 's  nuc l ea r  development i s  l a r g e l y  based on t h e  
Candu heavy wa te r  system which does  n o t  u s e  en r i ched  f u e l  
(and t h e r e f o r e  h a s  much lower energy requ i rements  f o r  f u e l  
p r o c e s s i n g ) .  The enr iched  f u e l  w i l l  presumably be expor ted ,  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  more r a p i d  d e p l e t i o n  of f u t u r e  Candu f u e l  s u p p l i e s  
and compe t i t i on  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a l e s  of  Candu systems.  The 
l a t e s t  p roposa l  by t h e  James Bay deve lope r s  i s  t h a t  Canada 
should  sw i t ch  i t s  own r e a c t o r s  from t h e  Candu system t o  en r i ched  
f u e l  sys tems.  
The Santee-Cooper P r o j e c t  
U n t i l  a  few y e a r s  ago,  t h e  U.S. Corps of  Engineers  had been 
spending around one m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  p e r  yea r  on d redg ing  and 
c l e a n i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  f o r  Cha r l e s ton  Harbor,  t h e  e s t u a r y  of t h e  
Cooper River  (72 c f s ) .  Seeing a  growing demand f o r  e s t u a r i n e  
development (boa t  b a s i n s ,  domest ic  and i n d u s t r i a l  p o l l u t i o n ) ,  
t hey  expected t h a t  d i v e r s i o n  of ano the r  r i v e r  (San tee ,  15000 c f s )  
i n t o  t h e  system would p rov ide  more n a t u r a l  f l u s h i n g  of s i l t  
and o t h e r  p o l l u t a n t s .  Unfor tuna te ly  t h e y  neg l ec t ed  t o  c o n s i d e r  
a  key f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  t h e  hydrodynamics of t h e  
e s t u a r y  ( 1 2 ) .  When t h e  f r e shwa te r  f low i s  low ( less  t h a n  about  
5000 c f s ) ,  t h e  f reshwater  mixes r a p i d l y  wi th  t h e  s a l t  water ,  
and t h e  whole e s tua ry  i s  f lushed  each day by t i d a l  movement of 
t h e  mixed inpu t  waters .  When t h e  flow i s  increased ,  t h e  e s tua ry  
becomes s t r a t i f i e d  and t h e  f reshwater  forms a  l e n s  over t h e  s a l t -  
water.  This l e n s  slows t h e  s a l t w a t e r  movement wi th  each t i d a l  
cyc le ;  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  s tagnant  pool of s a l t w a t e r  i s  c rea ted  
over t h e  e s t u a r y  bottom. This s tagnant  pool t r a p s  s i l t  and 
o t h e r  p o l l u t a n t s .  The annual dredging c o s t  has now increased 
t o  6-15 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  Though it would be t e c h n i c a l l y  f eas -  
i b l e  t o  d i scon t inue  t h e  flow d i v e r s i o n ,  it would be p o l i t i c a l l y  
d i f f i c u l t  and q u i t e  expensive t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  power 
genera t ion  t h a t  i s  a l s o  p a r t  of t h e  p r o j e c t .  
Salmon Enhancement i n  B. C.  
The Canadian government r e c e n t l y  decided t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
p roduc t iv i ty  of i t s  commercial sockeye salmon popula t ions  by 
inves t ing  i n  a r t i f i c i a l  spawning a r e a s  ( a  type  of "enhancement 
f a c i l i t y " )  f o r  some of t h e  a d u l t  f i s h  t o  d e p o s i t  t h e i r  eggs. 
Unfortunately  a  key f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  had n o t  been 
not iced  ( 1 4 ) .  The salmon a r e  apparent ly  l imi t ed  i n  t h e i r  t o t a l  
abundance not  by spawning a r e a s ,  bu t  by t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of t h e  
ocean (where t h e  f i s h  grow up a f t e r  a  s h o r t  per iod of f reshwater  
l i f e ) .  The enhancement f a c i l i t i e s  do inc rease  t h e  number of 
young produced by each spawning f i s h ,  a s  fewer spawners a r e  
needed t o  reach  t h e  abundance l i m i t  set  by ocean cond i t ions  - 
t h u s  a  higher percentage of t h e  a d u l t  f i s h  can be taken a s  
ca tch .  However, t h i s  c r e a t e s  another  d i f f i c u l t y ;  t h e  f i s h  
from enhancement f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  caught by n e t s  t h a t  a l s o  t ake  
o t h e r  less product ive  commercial s p e c i e s  and s p e c i e s  t h a t  
a r e  of cons ide rab le  r e c r e a t i o n a l  value.  To e x p l o i t  t h e  en- 
hancement f i s h  a t  h igher  r a t e s  wi thout  ove rexp lo i t i ng  t h e  o t h e r  
s p e c i e s ,  it w i l l  be necessary t o  b u i l d  enhancement f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  t h e  o t h e r  s p e c i e s  a l s o .  I n  t h e  l i m i t ,  t h e  less product ive  
n a t u r a l  popula t ions  could d i sappear  complete ly ,  making t h e  
f i s h e r y  economy dependent on a  few engineered f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  
a r e  h igh ly  vu lne rab le  t o  n a t u r a l  c a t a s t r o p h e s  such a s  f loods .  
The Spruce Budworm 
The spruce  budworm is a  s e r i o u s  f o r e s t  p e s t  i n  Eas te rn  
Canada. It a t t a c k s  mature f o r e s t  t r e e s ,  and has  had p e r i o d i c  
ou tbreaks  (every 4 0  t o  7 0  yea r s )  a t  l e a s t  s i n c e  t h e  17 th  
cen tury .  A f t e r  World War 11, it was decided t o  use  m i l i t a r y  
a i r c r a f t  t o  mount an i n s e c t i c i d e  spraying program over enormous 
a r e a s  of f o r e s t  land.  A t  f i r s t  t h e  spray ing  was d i r e c t e d  only 
a t  a  few a r e a s  of mature,  va luab le  f o r e s t .  However, t h e  land 
a r e a  i n  mature f o r e s t  cover  had increased  s t e a d i l y ,  and t h e  
spraying program has  grown accordingly.  The s i t u a t i o n  i s  now 
explos ive ,  wi th  huge a r e a s  of mature f o r e s t  r i p e  f o r  a t t a c k  
by t h e  i n s e c t i c i d e - r e s i s t a n t  budworm s t r a i n  t h a t  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  
appear.  The f o r e s t  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  spray ing  companies now form 
a powerful p o l i t i c a l  lobby t h a t  may prevent  any p o l i c y  change 
u n t i l  it is  t o o  l a t e .  
F i r e  Maintained F o r e s t s  
Many a r e a s  of North America and Europe have a  vege ta t ion  
system s p e c i a l l y  adapted t o  p e r i o d i c  f o r e s t  f i r e s  ( 1 7 ) .  The 
t y p i c a l  v e g e t a t i o n  community has  t h r e e  l a y e r s :  g r a s s ,  deciduous 
brush  and t rees,  and l a r g e  c o n i f e r o u s  trees ( u s u a l l y  p i n e ) .  
The c o n i f e r o u s  trees have a d a p t a t i o n s  t o  w i th s t and  sma l l  f o r e s t  
f i r e s :  t h i c k  ba rk  and s eeds  which on ly  germina te  a f t e r  ex- 
posure  t o  h igh  t empera tu res .  The system has  a  n a t u r a l  c y c l e ,  
i nvo lv ing  p e r i o d i c  f o r e s t  f i r e s  t h a t  c l e a r  away most of t h e  
b rush  and sma l l  trees wi thou t  k i l l i n g  t h e  l a r g e  c o n i f e r s .  
F o r e s t  management over  t h e  p a s t  few decades  ha s  been e x p l i c i t l y  
d i r e c t e d  a t  f i r e  p r even t ion ,  s o  t h e  brushy f u e l  h a s  accumulated 
t o  dangerous  l e v e l s  i n  many a r e a s .  The c o s t s  of f i r e  p r even t ion  
a r e  becoming p r o g r e s s i v e l y  h i g h e r ,  and when f i r e s  d o  occur  t hey  
a r e  ho t  enough t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  c o n i f e r o u s  f o r e s t .  When t h e  
l a r g e  trees a r e  de s t royed  over  l a r g e  a r e a s ,  n a t u r a l  r e g e n e r a t i o n  
i s  ve ry  slow and expensive  tree p l a n t i n g  becomes necessa ry .  
There have been expens ive  tes t  programs i nvo lv ing  mechanical  
removal of t h e  b rush ,  b u t  it appea r s  t h a t  l a r g e  l o s s e s  t o  f i r e  
w i l l  b e  i n e v i t a b l e  i n  many a r e a s .  
The Whaling I n d u s t r y  
Whale f i s h i n g  ha s  been a  p e r e n n i a l  p a i n  f o r  c o n s e r v a t i o n i s t s ,  
and t h e  problem has  become most a c u t e  s i n c e  World War 11. 
During t h e  l a t e  1940 ' s  and 195OVs,  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n s  developed 
( o r  al lowed development o f )  l a r g e ,  mechanized whaling f l e e t s  
and i n d u s t r i a l  p roces s ing  f a c i l i t i e s .  Th i s  development was 
l a r g e l y  based a t  f i r s t  on t h e  A n t a r c t i c  s t o c k s  of b l u e ,  f i n ,  
and sperm whales. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Whaling Commission, charged 
by t r e a t y  w i t h  recommending e f f e c t i v e  management p o l i c i e s ,  
became bogged down du r ing  t h e  postwar development p e r i o d  over  
a  series of q u e s t i o n s  i nvo lv ing  s u s t a i n a b l e  b i o l o g i c a l  y i e l d s  
and mechanisms f o r  c a t c h  r e g u l a t i o n .  Agreement abou t  b i o l o g i c a l  
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of  t h e  s t o c k s  has  now been reached  ( t h e  A n t a r c t i c  
s t o c k s  a r e  a l l  d e p l e t e d  and a t t e n t i o n  ha s  s h i f t e d  t o  n o r t h e r n  
p o p u l a t i o n s ) ,  b u t  an  even more s e r i o u s  i s s u e  h a s  a r i s e n  ( 8 ) .  
Japan a rgues  t h a t  it should  be al lowed t o  d e p l e t e  a l l  s t o c k s  
t o  t h e  minimum l e v e l  cons idered  s a f e  t o  p r even t  e x t i n c t i o n ,  
s i n c e  it must t r y  t o  r a p i d l y  recover  t h e  c o s t s  of i n d u s t r i a l  
expansion.  I n  o t h e r  words Japan c l a ims  t h a t  it has  t o o  much 
a t  s t a k e  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run ;  i n i t i a t i o n  of  sound long range  
p o l i c i e s  should  be d e f e r r e d  u n t i l  a l l  of  t h e  w o r l d ' s  whale 
s t o c k s  have been d e p l e t e d .  
An Alp ine  V i l l a g e  
The v i l l a g e  o f  Obergurgl ,  h igh  i n  t h e  T i r o l e a n  a l p s  of 
A u s t r i a ,  ha s  r e c e i v e d  i n t e n s i v e  s t udy  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Man 
and Biosphere  Pxogram. Nes t led  i n  a  p roduc t i ve  v a l l e y  surrounded 
by rugged mountains,  it i s  an  a lmost  p e r f e c t  microcosm of 
economic growth i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  l i m i t e d  environmenta l  r e s o u r c e s  ( 3 ) .  
Land ownership i n  t h e  v a l l e y  i s  t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by a  few 
f a m i l i e s ,  s o  t h e  demographic system i s  n e a r l y  c lo sed  t o  immigra- 
t i o n .  Fueled by an  a p p a r e n t l y  un l imi t ed  demand f o r  w i n t e r  
tour i sm ( s k i i n g )  and by popu la t i on  growth i n  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  
t h e r e  has  been r a p i d  development o f  t o u r i s t  f a c i l i t i e s  s i n c e  
1950; n e a r l y  every  young man i n  t h e  v i l l a g e  ha s  been a b l e  t o  
b u i l d  a  sma l l  h o t e l  o r  "Gasthaus".  Now t h e  b u i l d i n g  land ( s a f e  
from ava l anches )  and t h e  b e s t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l and  a r e  r a p i d l y  
d i s a p p e a r i n g ,  wa te r  p o l l u t i o n  problems a r e  becoming s e v e r e ,  
and t h e  f r a g i l e  a l p i n e  v e g e t a t i o n  communities a r e  b reak ing  
down ( r e s u l t i n g  i n  s e v e r e  e r o s i o n  problems and more a v a l a n c h e s ) .  
The popu la t i on  of  t h e  v i l l a g e  ha s  doubled s i n c e  1950, and t h e r e  
is a  l a r g e  c o h o r t  of  young people  who w i l l  soon be  demanding 
t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  b u i l d  h o t e l s .  These young peop le  come l a r g e l y  
from t h e  poo re r  farming f a m i l i e s  who had t h e  l a n d ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  
t h e  t i m e  nor  t h e  educa t i on  t o  j o i n  i n  on t h e  i n i t i a l  boom. 
Seeing t h e  wea l t h  of t h e i r  ne ighbors ,  t h e s e  f a m i l i e s  a r e  now 
determined t o  b u i l d  a d d i t i o n a l  h o t e l s ,  and t h e y  r e f u s e  t o  t a k e  
s e r i o u s l y  any warnings  about  environmenta l  problems (on which 
t h e i r  own b u s i n e s s  w i l l  depend) o r  t h e  need t o  ma in t a in  some 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  By u s ing  t h e  l a s t  s a f e  b u i l d i n g  l and  
f o r  more h o t e l s ,  t hey  w i l l  even c u t  o f f  t h e  o p t i o n  of  u s ing  
some land f o r  l i g h t  i n d u s t r y  o r  o t h e r  development t h a t  miqht 
p rov lde  an  economic b u f f e r  a g a i n s t  d e c l i n e s  i n  t h e  t o u r i s t  
i n d u s t r y .  
3 .  General  P r o p e r t i e s  of Fo rec lo s ing  Sequences 
I could  f i l l  many more pages  w i th  examples, b u t  t h e  b a s i c  
i s s u e s  r eappea r  w i t h  monotonous r e g u l a r i t y .  Nor a r e  t h e y  con- 
f i n e d  t o  t h e  r e g i o n a l  and l o c a l  s c a l e ;  w i t n e s s  t h e  c u r r e n t  
energy crisis and t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of American d e c i s i o n  makers 
t o  c o n s i d e r  extreme measures i n  t h e  Middle E a s t  f o r  ma in t a in ing  
h igh  inves tment  i n  pet roleum based i n d u s t r i e s .  
One could  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  examples simply r e p r e s e n t  bad 
d e c i s i o n  making and f a i l u r e  t o  u s e  a v a i l a b l e  methodologies  
p rope r ly .  I f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  makers had been more t h o u g h t f u l  i n  
each c a s e  and had c a r e f u l l y  o u t l i n e d  f u t u r e  o p t i o n s  and un- 
c e r t a i n t i e s ,  t h e y  c e r t a i n l y  might have done b e t t e r .  But t h e  sad  
f a c t  i s  t h a t  people a r e  not  omniscient ,  and they  q u i t e  l i k e l y  
would have done j u s t  what they a c t u a l l y  d i d .  I n  each case  
t h e  problems a r o s e  n o t  because of poor p r o b a b i l i s t i c  assessments 
of recognized u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  bu t  i n s t e a d  because of fundamental 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  w e r e  no t  recognized a t  a l l .  
L e t  u s  be more p r e c i s e  about t h e  gene ra l  sequence of 
even t s  under lying a l l  of t h e  examples (Table 1).  I n  each case  
t h e r e  i s  an i n i t i a l ,  apparen t ly  i n t e l l i g e n t  investment dec i s ion .  
This  investment has  t h r e e  c r i t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s :  
(1) it i s  based on f a i t h  t h a t  p r e s e n t  t r e n d s  w i l l  cont inue  
i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e ,  o r  t h a t  system response w i l l  be 
monotonically r e l a t e d  t o  investment i n p u t ;  
( 2 )  it e n t a i l s  an  economic and p o l i t i c a l  commitment t o  
t r y  t o  recover  investment c o s t s ,  even i f  t h e r e  i s  no 
i r r e v e r s i b l e  l o s s  of nonrenewable r e sources ;  
( 3 )  i t s  shortcomings (due t o  f a i l u r e  t o  recognize  some 
b a s i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p s )  can be a l l e v i a t e d  a t  l e a s t  
t emporar i ly  by f u r t h e r  investment.  
The next  s t e p  is an a d d i t i o n a l  investment ( o r  use  of 
r e sources )  t o  t r y  t o  c o r r e c t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  mis takes .  This  
second investment i s  aga in  r a t i o n a l  i n  t h e  same t e r m s  a s  t h e  
f i r s t ;  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  would be t o  r e v e r s e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e c i s i o n  
and accept  t h e  investment l o s s .  Most d e c i s i o n  makers would 
f i n d  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l l y  and psychologica l ly  unaccept- 
a b l e ,  f o r  obvious reasons.  Thus t h e  sequence i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ;  
some would c a l l  t h i s  "progress" .  
I f  t h e  process  of c n r r e c t i v e  investment could be maintained 
Table 1. Summary of t h e  Example Problems. 
Case 
C r i t i c a l  F a c t o r s  
I n i t i a l  Decision Over looked 
Endpoint Consequence of  
t h e  Sequence 
James Bay P r o j e c t  Hydroe lec t r i c  Power demands, Rapid d e p l e t i o n  of Canadian 
development environmental concerns ,  nuc lea r  f u e l  r e s e r v e s ,  compe t i t ion  
Indian  c u l t u r e  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a l e s  w i t h  
Candu system 
Santee-Cooper P r o j e c t  Flow d i v e r s i o n  E s t u a r i n e  hydrodynamic c o s t l y  dredging program, l o s s  
t r a n s i t i o n  from mixed of environmental  q u a l i t y  
t o  s t r a t i f i e d  
Salmon Enhancement A r t i f i c i a l  
spawning a r e a  
Spruce Budworm I n s e c t i c i d e  
spraying 
Ocean l i m i t a t i o n  of Cos t ly  enhancement program, I 
popula t ion  s i z e  l o s s  of n a t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  I-' 
I 
F o r e s t  growth 
F i r e  Maintained F o r e s t s  F i r e  c o n t r o l  Growth of brushy 
f i r e  f u e l  
Whaling Indus t ry  
Alpine Vi l l age  
Enormous spraying c o s t ,  
exp los ive  outbreak s i t u a t i o n  
I n t o l e r a b l e  c o s t s  f o r  f i r e  
c o n t r o l ,  d e s t r u c t i v e  f i r e s  
Management Dynamics of Choice between l a r g e  economic 
emphasis on commercial investment l o s s  o r  e x t i n c t i o n  of whale 
c a t c h  c o n t r o l  s t o c k s  
Hotel  development D i s t r i b u t i o n  of wealth Economic "monoculture" based 
only on tourism 
i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  t h e r e  would be no problem. But t h e  examples 
suggest  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  endpoints,  with very d i s tu rb ing  proper- 
t i e s :  
(1) Even i f  it i s  highly product ive,  t h e  endpoint system 
i s  dangerously s impl i f i ed ,  s o  t h a t  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  
s i m i l a r  per turbat ions1 have much more d i s a s t r o u s  
r e l a t i v e  e f f e c t s  than a t  t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  sequence. 
( 2 )  The endpoint system may be impossibly c o s t l y  t o  
maintain,  y e t  t h e  l a r g e s t  induced economic i n f r a -  
s t r u c t u r e  may depend on i t s  maintenance. The sunk 
c o s t s  ( p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of c a p i t a l  investment) and 
t h e  immediate c o s t s  of f a i l u r e  a r e  h ighes t .  
( 3 )  The number of economically acceptable  ( b e n e f i t s  exceed 
c o s t s )  opt ions  f o r  f u r t h e r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  approaches 
zero,  even i f  r i s k  aversion i s  low. 
4 .  More Prec i se  Def in i t ions  of t h e  Problem 
Let me now s t a t e  a  s p e c i f i c  hypothesis:  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  
s p e c i a l  kind of pa thologica l  dec i s ion  behavior t h a t  can a r i s e  
i n  perhaps a l l  s equen t i a l  dec i s ion  problems. This behavior has 
i t s  r o o t s  i n  a  very human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c :  we do no t  l i k e  t o  
admit and pay f o r  our p a s t  mistakes. The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of t h e  pa thologica l  behavior a r e  increas ing  investment, increas ing  
c o s t s  f o r  system maintenance, fo rec losure  of dec i s ion  opt ions ,  
and decreased a b i l i t y  of t h e  managed resource system t o  absorb 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  s i m i l a r  n a t u r a l  per turba t ions .  The impression i s  
1 
e.g. bad water flow f o r  one year i n  t h e  a rea  of a  salmon 
hatchery,  a  s i n g l e  l a r g e  input  of p o l l u t a n t s ,  a  f o r e s t  f i r e .  
that a single innocuous investment error can lead almost 
inevitably to destruction of the managed system. Surely such 
sequences can be avoided in most cases, if we simply recognize 
their existence and learn to watch out for them at the outset. 
Note that each of the example decision sequences of the 
previous section begins with a decision that was not actually 
the first development decision for the resource. In each 
case I have tried to pick up the decision sequence at the critical 
point where the foreclosure or locking-in process began in earnest. 
A Simple Classification 
The examples suggest that we can distinguish at least 
three types of option foreclosure, in terms of the mechanisms 
that prevent retreat from faulty investment points: 
(1) classical situations involving "irreversible" physical 
change 
(2) situations involving changes in expectations for 
future returns, i.e. political or economic acceptability 
(3) situations involving loss of capital reserves to error 
correction (forced investments necessary to satisfy 
basic constraints imposed by society) 
Of these, the irreversible physical changes are perhaps the 
least bothersome, since they are easily recognized and exposed 
for judgement in the decision making process. 
Changes in political and economic acceptability can be 
defined more precisely in the context of Paretian analysis. 
Consider a situation in which there are two kinds of benefits 
or beneficiaries, and a fuzzy or ill defined set of decision 
options that are expected to produce different combinations 
of t h e s e  b e n e f i t s  ( F i g u r e  1). Suppose t h a t  t h e  system i s  
c u r r e n t l y  o p e r a t i n g  ( o r  producing,  o r  expec ted  t o  produce)  
w i t h  a dominated p o l i c y  ( i .e .  b e t t e r  o p t i o n s  a r e  p o s s i b l e ) .  
An i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u r v e  of e q u a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  b e n e f i t  combinat ions  
c a n  be  drawn th rough  t h e  c u r r e n t  p o l i c y ,  and o p t i o n s  below 
t h i s  c u r v e  a r e  presumably f o r e c l o s e d .  I f  t h e r e  i s  an  i nc r eme n ta l  
inves tment  t o  a new p o l i c y  p o s i t i o n  ( e . g .  when p o s i t i o n  2 i n  
F i g u r e  1 i s  p e r c e i v e d ) ,  a d d i t i o n a l  o p t i o n s  a r e  l o s t .  The key 
p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  P a r e t o  f r o n t i e r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  poo r ly  
d e f i n e d  ( though i n  a l i m i t e d  p h y s i c a l  world it must e x i s t ) ,  
and t h e  h i g h e r  b e n e f i t  o p t i o n s  n e a r  it a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be a s -  
s o c i a t e d  w i t h  some of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o u t l i n e d  above (system 
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ,  e t c . ) .  
Loss of  c a p i t a l  r e s e r v e s  t o  e r r o r  c o r r e c t i o n  is  w e l l  
i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  salmon example. The Canadian government 
h a s  dec ided  t o  i n v e s t  $300 m i l l i o n  i n  salmon enhancement over  
t h e  n e x t  few y e a r s .  Y e t  each spawning channe l ,  which c o s t s  
less t h a n  $1  m i l l i o n ,  may f o r c e  a d d i t i o n a l  inves tments  of  up 
t o  $10 m i l l i o n  i n  h a t c h e r y  f a c i l i t i e s .  A t  t h a t  r a t e ,  it would 
n o t  t a k e  long t o  remove a l l  f l e x i b i l i t y  from t h e  inves tment  
program. 
A P o l i c y  R e s i l i e n c e  P e r s p e c t i v e  
The o p t i o n  f o r e c l o s u r e  p r o c e s s  i s  ana lagous  t o  H o l l i n g ' s  
e c o l o g i c a l  " r e s i l i e n c e "  i d e a  ( 7 ) .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  e c o l o g i c a l  
s t a t e  sp ace s  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by s t a b i l i t y  r e g i o n s .  When 
t h e  boundar ies  between t h e s e  r e g i o n s  a r e  c r o s s e d ,  e n t i r e l y  
d i f f e r e n t  e c o l o g i c a l  behav ior  can  b e  expec ted  ( f o r  example, 
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FIGlTRE 1 .  Indifference cu rves  through exis t ing o r  expected 
benefit s i tuat ions  can define s e t s  of fol-eclosed 
options.  
a boundary might be def ined by t h e  e x t i n c t i o n  threshold  
f o r  some s p e c i e s ) .  H e  argues f u r t h e r  t h a t  some p o l i c i e s  may 
a l t e r  t h e  s i z e  o r  s t a b i l i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  d e s i r a b l e  
s t a t e  space reg ions .  Ins tead  of an  eco log ica l  s t a t e  space,  
w e  can t h i n k  of an a b s t r a c t  d e c i s i o n  space. The idea  i s  t h a t  
t h e r e  should e x i s t  dec i s ion  combinations t h a t  can be appl ied  
s e q u e n t i a l l y  f o r  long per iods  of t i m e  without  s e r i o u s  con- 
sequences. There e x i s t  o the r  dec i s ions  ( o u t s i d e  of boundaries 
analogous t o  s t a b i l i t y  boundaries) t h a t  lead t o  a  p o s i t i v e  
feedback response (investment making more investment necessary, 
making more . . .)  and a  narrowing tunnel  of f e a s i b l e  o r  v i a b l e  
d e c i s i o n  combinations. 
One way of looking a t  t h e  analogy is  t o  cons ider  a  set 
of p o s s i b l e  investment A , B , C , D ,  ..... ,n}. Presumably 
some of t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  s e n s i b l e  on ly  i f  o t h e r s  have been 
made. L e t  us  denote  by arrows(-) t hose  incremental  i nves t -  
ment d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  and economically f e a s i b l e  
(though not  n e c e s s a r i l y  Pare to  admiss ib le )  a f t e r  any i n i t i a l  
dec i s ion  has  been made. W e  can then  draw a network of 
d e c i s i o n  t r a n s i t i o n s :  
It appears that networks of this kind can have some very 
interesting properties: 
(1) There can be "stable" regions (A+WC+D+E-+F 
transitions versus P+Q+R+--YT transitions). 
(2) There can be sequences leading to a positive feedback 
endpoint (0) as in the budworm and forest examples. 
(3) There can be open ended, irreversible sequences 
(W-+X+Y+Z) that depend on the economist's world 
of unlimited potential substitutes (technological 
innovation) . 
Presumably one aim of systems analysis should be to help find 
sequences that lead out of the traps. 
There is no necessary association between state space 
behavior (stability boundaries, extinction limits, etc.) of 
the resource system, as opposed to the locking-in process. 
We would call the natural budworm system resilient - it fluc- 
tuates enormously but persists over time. There is no reason 
to believe that the existing, managed budworm system is any 
less resilient in that sense; it is bound to undergo a very 
large fluctuation when the insecticides fail, but it will 
quite probably still exist. In evolving to become a periodic 
pest, the budworm itself played a game analogous to the locking- 
in process: it became more and more specialized and efficient 
at attacking balsam fir trees. Also, it is probably not true 
that the present managed equilibrium between budworm and 
trees is less stable in the sense that it has a narrower region 
of state space stability - it is just that the same qualitative 
perturbation (insecticide resistence) will cause a much larger 
state change now. 
We can bring the decision space and state space resilience 
concepts together with a very simple-minded model, based 
on the whaling example. Let us consider the main decision 
variable for whaling management to be the level of fleet 
investment, I (number of operating vessels, say). Suppose 
that this investment has an annual unit repayment cost or 
depreciation rate r. The annual fixed costs are then rI. 
Suppose that the total operating costs for fishing are related 
to whale population N according to the simple relationship 
O.C. = 9 I where q is a constant. Suppose that the boats can N 
take an annual catch equal to cNI (this is reasonable only 
provided cNI << N), and that each whale can be sold at a price 
p. Then the boats will not go out unless catch is greater 
than operating costs: cN1 2 9 I, or equivalently N 2 N 
This inequality sets one boundary in the state-decision space. 
Next, let us pretend that the whale stock can produce an annual 
sustainable catch (excess of births over natural deaths) 
Cs = aN(1 - bN) where a and b are positive constants. This 
equation says that the sustainable catch is small for small 
populations sizes, larger for intermediate populations, and 
small for large populations. Now let us ask: at what invest- 
ment levels is it economically feasible (not necessarily 
profitable) to maintain a given stock size? The answer is given 
by the simple inequality pCs - > rI + 9 I (provided N 2 N 
which can be rewritten as: 
That is, it is economically feasible to maintain a decision- 
state combination {I,N\ only if it satisfies this inequality. 
Figure 2 shows how these whale equations look in decision- 
state space. The space is partitioned into regions, based on 
inequalities (1) and (2) and on the assumption that there 
exists an extinction threshold for the population. Stochastic 
stock changes or uncontrolled investment would tend to move 
the system out of the "stable" region where it is economically 
feasible to maintain the biological system. Likewise, parameter 
changes could expand or contract the region; examining in- 
equality (2), the suggestion is that price increases should 
expand the region, while depreciation rate increases (r) 
should contract it. Within the region, a variety of investment 
options are available; outside the region to the right, only 
fixed or increasing investment is feasible. Near the left 
side of the graph, only fixed investment (followed by collapse) 
is feasible, and extinction is likely. It is as though there 
is a narrowing tunnel of feasible next actions as the lefthand 
boundary of the feasible management region is approached from 
the right (see Figure 2). The width of the feasible region 
decreases as investment is increased; thus the system becomes 
dangerously "unstable" to state and parameter perturbations 
STOCK,N (STATE AXIS )  
FIGURE 2.  Partitioning of the deeision - state space for  
whale management. Explanation in text. 
" Feasible " z economic benefits > costs.  
a s  investment i s  pushed t o  i t s  l i m i t  f o r  economically f e a s i b l e  
s u s t a i n e d  y i e l d  management. 
Haefele  (5 )  has  proposed a  very  s imple  and g e n e r a l  model 
t o  d e s c r i b e  s o c i e t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between popula t ion  and 
t h e  development of energy r e sou rces .  Th i s  model p rov ides  
a  second kind of example of boundar ies  i n  t h e  s t a t e - d e c i s i o n  
space.  H i s  equa t ions  l ead  t o  t h e  phase r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
energy and popu la t ions  a s  shown i n  F igu re  3 .  
H e  argues  t h a t  we a r e  now along t h e  s e p a r a t r i x  "A" and 
t h a t  w e  should move away from t h i s  s e p a r a t r i x  t o  t h e  r i g h t ,  
i n t o  t h e  s t a b l e  growth r eg ion  a .  I would argue j u s t  t h e  
oppos i te :  w e  should make every e f f o r t  t o  remain - on t h e  
s e p a r a t r i x ,  s o  a s  t o  keep open t h e  o p t i o n  of moving t o  a  
low-population, high-energy system. It  i s  easy t o  imagine 
p o l i t i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  investments  f o r  moving away from t h e  
"b" t r a n s i e n t ,  whereas t h e  "a"  t r a n s i e n t s  lock u s  i n t o  a  
growth s i t u a t i o n  wi th  few p a l a t a b l e  o p t i o n s  f o r  r e t r e a t .  
5. Towards B e t t e r  Methodoloqies 
The e m p i r i c a l  examples above i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  p roces s  
of op t ion  l o s s  i s  t r i g g e r e d  by ignorance about t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
of system r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I f  t h i s  i s  s o ,  how can it be p o s s i b l e  
t o  avoid t h e  t r a p ,  wi thout  going t o  t h e  r i d i c u l o u s  extreme 
of n o t  i n v e s t i n g  a t  a l l ?  S t r i c t l y  speaking,  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  has  
no answer; it i s  always p o s s i b l e  t o  make mis takes .  Le t  u s  
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f i r s t  ask  f o r  s imple  s t e p s  and g u i d e l i n e s  t h a t  can be followed 
t o  make t h e  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n s  a t  l e a s t  less l i k e l y .  
The f i r s t ,  u t t e r l y  c r i t i c a l  s t e p  is  t o  s h i f t  our  b a s i c  
way of th inking  about systems dec i s ion  problems. Now w e  
tend t o  t h i n k  about  s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n s  o r  ope ra t ing  p o l i c i e s ,  
and w e  work despe ra t e ly  t o  p r e d i c t  n a t u r a l  system consequences 
of these .  Environmental modelling and cross-impact ana lyses  (10) 
a r e  good examples: w e  impose va r ious  p o l i c i e s  on a  s imulated 
system, then  a sk  f o r  t h e  system consequences. W e  should 
in s t ead  be asking about t h e  d e c i s i o n  consequences of p o l i c y  
f a i l u r e  - t h a t  i s ,  w e  should ask  ques t ions  such a s :  " I f  po l i cy  
x f a i l s  o r  proves inadequate ,  what kind of d e c i s i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  be taken next?"  I f  w e  can begin t o  i d e n t i f y  dangerous 
sequences by asking such ques t ions ,  it should become much e a s i e r  
t o  make q u a l i t a t i v e  choices  a t  each d e c i s i o n  p o i n t ,  wi thout  
r e s o r t i n g  t o  decep t ive  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s  such a s  c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  r a t i o s .  
Some Prel iminary Housecleaning 
Before i d e n t i f y i n g  some approaches t o  avoid t h e  locking- 
i n  process ,  l e t  us f i r s t  examine some of t h e  widely used 
d e c i s i o n  t o o l s  t h a t  apparent ly  he lp  t o  cause t h e  problem i n  
t h e  f i r s t  p lace .  This  should h e l p  narrow t h e  sea rch  f o r  b e t t e r  
methodologies. 
Perhaps t h e  most dangerous d e c i s i o n  t o o l  now a v a i l a b l e  
is  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  cos t -bene f i t  a n a l y s i s .  In  theory  t h e  method 
t a k e s  r i s k s  i n t o  account through d iscount ing  r a t e s  and through 
i n c l u s i o n  of oppor tun i ty  c o s t s .  However, t h e r e  i s  a  tempta- 
t i o n  i n  app ly ing  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  t o  assume t h a t  "second- 
a ry"  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be sma l l  r e l a t i v e  t o  
"primary" ones  ( 1 6 ) ;  t h u s  t h e r e  i s  a  tendency t o  i gno re  t h e  
kind of " c o r r e c t i v e  investment"  p roces s  t h a t  cou ld  l e a d  t o  a  
p a t h o l o g i c a l  d e c i s i o n  sequence. Cos t -bene f i t  a n a l y s i s  is  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  good a t  l e ad ing  u s  i n t o  t h e  "economies of  s c a l e "  
t r a p  (w i tnes s  t h e  James Bay); l a r g e r  u n i t  inves tments  a r e  one 
of t h e  s u r e s t  ways t o  g e t  boxed i n t o  a  p o s i t i o n  from which it 
i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  i n f e a s i b l e  t o  r e t r e a t .  
A s l i g h t l y  more a t t r a c t i v e  se t  of t echniques  is a v a i l a b l e  
under t h e  g e n e r a l  heading "dec i s ion  making under u n c e r t a i n t y "  
(11). Decis ion trees and s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  assessments  
g i v e  some hope of he lp ing  t o  b e t t e r  s t r u c t u r e  our  t h i n k i n g  
about  s e q u e n t i a l  d e c i s i o n  problems. One d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  
d e c i s i o n  trees become unmanageably l a r g e  i n  a  hu r ry ,  and t h e  
"normative form" of a n a l y s i s  may l ead  us  t o  over look t h e  
dangerous branches .  Also d e c i s i o n  t ree ana lyse s  t end  t o  con- 
c e n t r a t e  our  a t t e n t i o n  on f u t u r e  investment  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  
when w e  should o f t e n  be cons ide r ing  r e t r o g r e s s i v e  branches  
invo lv ing  t h e  accep tance  of investment  l o s s e s  due t o  p a s t  
mis takes .  
There has  been much i n t e r e s t  r e c e n t l y  i n  P a r e t i a n  a n a l y s i s  
and rnetagame t h e o r y  because t hey  h e l p  u s  t o  t h i n k  about  
problems of m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e s  and c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  
But t h e s e  methods r e q u i r e  a  ve ry  p r e c i s e  s ta tement  of a v a i l a b l e  
o p t i o n s  and p o s s i b l e  outcomes. This  requirement  may be  a  
g r e a t  psychological  a i d  (it i s  n i c e  t o  f e e l  t h a t  a  problem 
i s  under c o n t r o l ,  wi th  very e x p l i c i t  boundar ies ) ,  bu t  t h e  
dangers a r e  a s  g r e a t  a s  i n  cos t -bene f i t  a n a l y s i s .  
I have been a  s t rong  advocate of l a r g e  s imula t ion  models 
wi th  l o t s  of c o n t r o l  knobs and p o i n t s  f o r  e n t e r i n g  d e c i s i o n  
op t ions  ( 3 ) .  The process  of bu i ld ing  such models involves  a  
way of th inking  t h a t  he lps  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l l y  
c r i t i c a l  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  bu t  I f i n d  a  dangerous 
tendency t o  be l u l l e d  i n t o  be l i ev ing  t h a t  a l l  of t h e  major 
f a c t o r s  have been taken i n t o  account. W e  w e r e  over a  year  
along i n t o  a  happy e x e r c i s e  i n  salmon enhancement modelling 
before  our  programmer (Mike S t a l e y )  turned up t h e  ocean s u r v i v a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  may t r i g g e r  a  bad sequence of f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n s  
(see examples s e c t i o n ) .  We should have been concerned wi th  
t h e  dec i s ion  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l ace ,  r a t h e r  than 
wi th  our d e t a i l e d  modelling of t h e  salmon product ion system. 
General Options f o r  Approaching t h e  Problem 
W e  must go beyond t h e  t r i v i a l  awareness t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  
fol low one another  and can lead  i n t o  t r o u b l e .  I t  seems t o  m e  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  s t r a t e g i c  op t ions  f o r  f u r t h e r  
work: 
(1) W e  can t r y  t o  dev i se  b e t t e r  methods f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  
(d iscover ing ,  a n t i c i p a t i n g )  dangerous r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
and d e c i s i o n  sequences. That is,  we can t r y  t o  g e t  
r i d  of t h e  unknowns t h a t  cause t h e  t r o u b l e  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  p lace .  
(2)  W e  can t r y  t o  analyze known c r i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  p o i n t s  
i n  hopes t h a t  such p o i n t s  have s p e c i a l  a t t r i b u t e s  
t h a t  make them r ecogn izab l e  even i f  w e  cannot  see 
t h e  e n t i r e  f o r e c l o s i n g  sequence t h a t  t h e y  e n t a i l .  
There  a r e  some obvious  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  development 
of i n d i c a t o r s :  s i z e  of i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  inves tment ,  
etc.  
( 3 )  I f  w e  s imply admit  t h a t  it i s  imposs ib le  t o  avo id  
f o r e c l o s i n g  sequences ,  w e  can  t r y  t o  f i n d  g e n e r a l  
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  inc rementa l  inves tment  t h a t  pe rmi t  
g r a c e f u l  r e t r e a t  when mi s t akes  a r e  recognized .  
H o l l i n g ' s  budworm work ( 6 )  on sp read ing  of  v a r i a b i l i t y  
i n  space  r a t h e r  t h a n  t i m e  is  a  s t e p  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  
Another way t o  d i s c u s s  t h i s  o p t i o n  is i n  t e rms  of 
a d a p t i v e  c o n t r o l :  How can  w e  make t h e  p r o c e s s  of 
d e t e c t i n g  and c o r r e c t i n g  e r r o r s  more e f f e c t i v e ,  wi th-  
o u t  r e t r e a t i n g  t o  such sma l l  and widely  spaced i n -  
c r emen ta l  inves tments  t h a t  development becomes 
p r o h i b i t i v e l y  c o s t l y ?  I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  o p t i o n ,  
t h e r e  is  a  need t o  d e v i s e  c r i t e r i a  and i n d i c a t o r s  
o t h e r  t h a n  s h o r t  run  economic e f f i c i e n c y  f o r  judging 
inves tments .  
A Format f o r  P r a c t i c a l  Ana lys i s  
I n  t h e  long r u n ,  t h e  b e s t  s t r a t e g i e s  may be t o  d e v i s e  
new investment  approaches  and c r i t e r i a  f o r  development ( t h i r d  
o p t i o n  above) .  However, it i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  myopic e f f i c i e n c y  
c r i t e r i a  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  dominate development p lann ing  f o r  
some t i m e .  Thus t h e  immediate need is  f o r  approaches  t h a t  
help uncover the nasty surprises and decision consequences 
before investment commitments are made. Considering the variety 
of surprises that can occur, such approaches must necessarily 
be of an interdisciplinary, systems character; they must 
involve a more critical and imaginative dialogue than has been 
developed through teamwork in the past. 
A variety of methodologies now exists for identifying 
critical assumptions and impacts, such as expert review tech- 
niques (e.g. the Delphi method), cross-impact analyses, and 
interdisciplinary workshops (15). These methodologies can be 
given a stronger focus for asking more careful questions if 
they are oriented to the specific task of producing large 
scale dynamic models. Such models rarely have any real 
predictive power, but they do force a more careful statement 
of assumptions than is usual in verbal discourse, and they 
have a sometimes embarrassing way of revealing unnoticed 
assumptions by producing ridiculous predictions. 
Let us assume that we have gone through a modelling 
exercise aimed at revealing the system consequences of some 
decision options. We can then construct a table analogous 
to a cross-impact matrix, but with the model assumptions 
listed against the decision options: 
Assumptions 
( 2 )  ( 3 )  . . . . . . . . . 
Investment ( 2  1 
Then for each row-column position in the table, we can ask 
the question: "What corrective investment(s) would follow 
under this (row) decision option if this (column) assumption 
is violated?". Such an "option-assumption" table is a purely 
psychological tool, intended to help organize the process 
of asking questions about decision consequences. Also, it 
is a first-order tool; it does not help to ask about the con- 
sequences if several assumptions are simultaneously incorrect. 
We have applied a simplified version of the procedure in 
dealing with the salmon enhancement problem in cooperation 
with scientists of the Canadian government. The results 
were remarkable: not only were some startling decision 
consequences revealed, but the questioning also helped to 
stimulate the scientists to do imaginative thinking about new 
options to consider for the initial investment program. 
Each element of the option-assumption table can be viewed 
as a window, opening into a future decision tree or another 
option-assumption table; the problem of analysis can quickly 
become impossibly large. There may be no way to avoid some 
"pruning" (11) of the problem, by arbitrarily closing some 
windows that seem particularly improbable. At this point in 
the analysis it may be worthwhile to begin introducing some 
formal methods from decision theory; judgemental probabilities 
for different assumption errors can be elicited and combined 
with expected costs and benefits to arrive at filter weightings 
for each window. The windows with low weightings can then 
be filtered out or discarded in further analyses. This procedure, 
and other formalisms that might be applied later in weighing 
the remaining alternatives, are only meaningful if the original 
modelling or assumption identification exercise has been 
successful. There will always remain some residual uncertainty 
(unrecognized windows); the important thing is to minimize 
this uncertainty before the formal decision analysis is 
undertaken. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to draw together a different 
perspective on sequential decision problems in resource develop- 
ment. It has been long on questions and criticisms, but short 
on constructive suggestions. The main conclusion is simple: 
while we may avoid some pathological decision sequences by 
more careful systems analysis, the real need is for more 
imaginative approaches to the design of investment programs 
better able to cope with nasty surprises. 
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